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SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA TAKES MERITORIOUS CLAIMS 
BACK HOME TO THE PLACE THEY BELONG 
By  
Emma Kline* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In State ex rel. TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. Kaufman, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia concluded that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County 
exceeded its authority when it ruled on the merits of an issue that ultimately was 
referred to arbitration.1 The Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that when a trial 
court is required to rule on a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the trial court is limited to determining the threshold 
issues of: 1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties; and 
2) “whether the claims averred by the plaintiff fall within the substantive scope of 
that arbitration agreement.”2 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
 In Ameritrade, Dan Salamie, appellee, filed a civil action against Bruce 
Conrad, an independent financial advisor, and Ameritrade, a New York discount 
brokerage firm (together, “appellants”).3 Salamie alleged that he sustained 
financial loss when Conrad disregarded specific instructions concerning Salamie’s 
investment holdings in four Ameritrade accounts.4 Salamie also asserted that 
Ameritrade was vicariously liable for Conrad’s actions, as Conrad was a registered 
representative of Ameritrade.5 After Salamie served his first discovery requests on 
                                                 
* Emma Kline is a 2012 Juris Doctor candidate at the Pennsylvania State University 
Dickinson School of Law.  
1 State ex rel. TD Ameritrade, Inc., v. Kaufman, 692 S.E.2d 293, 294 (W. Va. 2010).  
2 Id. at 298.  
3 Id. at 295. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
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Ameritrade, Ameritrade filed a motion for protective order and also informed the 
trial court that it intended to file a motion to compel arbitration.6 In its motion, 
Ameritrade requested that the trial court dismiss Salamie’s litigation claim, or else 
stay the litigation pending the outcome of the arbitral decision.7 Before the trial 
court decided the issue to compel arbitration, the parties met to attempt settlement 
negotiations.8 Salamie said that he would submit to arbitration if Ameritrade would 
stipulate that Conrad was “subject to its ‘control’” under federal securities law; 
doing so would indicate that Ameritrade was vicariously liable for Conrad’s 
actions.9 Ameritrade refused to stipulate.10  
 Salamie then filed a motion for partial summary judgment.11 Although he 
agreed to participate in arbitration, Salamie “requested a ruling from the trial court 
as part of the referral on whether Conrad was a ‘controlled person’ under federal 
law for purposes of establishing vicarious liability against Ameritrade.”12 The trial 
court granted Ameritrade’s motion to compel arbitration, but also approved 
Salamie’s motion for partial summary judgment.13 In addition to determining that 
Ameritrade was responsible for “monitoring” Salamie’s account and for complying 
with certain New York Stock Exchange Rules, the circuit court also held that, 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78(t), Conrad was a “controlled person,” making 
Ameritrade vicariously liable for his actions.14 The trial court also ordered the 
arbitrator to follow the aforementioned determinations.15 Ameritrade subsequently 
filed a rule to show cause to prohibit enforcement of the trial court’s 
                                                 
6 Ameritrade, 692 S.E.2d at 295.  
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Ameritrade, 692 S.E.2d at 295.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 295-96.  
15 Id. at 296.  
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determinations that “address[ed] the merits of matters that were referred to 
arbitration for resolution.”16 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
 In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia focused on whether “the lower tribunal’s order [was] clearly 
erroneous as a matter of law.”17 On appeal, Ameritrade primarily contended that 
the trial court was not permitted to address the merits of the underlying 
controversy, namely whether Conrad was subject to Ameritrade’s control pursuant 
to the Securities Exchange Act.18 Ameritrade believed that the trial court 
“exceeded the scope of its legitimate powers” in determining that Conrad was in 
fact subject to Ameritrade’s control. 19 Conversely, Salamie maintained that the 
trial court’s rulings were “prophylactic,” and that without a determination of 
whether Conrad was a “controlled person,” no contract requiring arbitration would 
exist.20 Important to note is that the parties were not in dispute regarding the 
arbitration provisions in each investment account, nor were they concerned about 
the applicability of the FAA; the parties only contested whether the trial court had 
the authority to address matters aside from the issue of arbitrability.21 The Supreme 
Court ultimately sided with Ameritrade, and explained that “‘in deciding whether 
the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not 
to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claim.’”22 
                                                 
16 Ameritrade, 692 S.E.2d at 296.  
17 Id.  
18 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §78(t)).  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at n.10. 
21 Ameritrade, 692 S.E.2d at 297.  
22 Id. at 296 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)) 
(emphasis added).  
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 The Supreme Court of West Virginia relied on established federal law, 
which recognizes that courts are not permitted to review the merits of a grievance, 
including whether equity is present in the particular claim, or whether language is 
present in the agreement tending to support a party’s claim.23 Ameritrade 
recognized, and the Supreme Court agreed, that when the trial court inquired as to 
whether Conrad was a “controlled person” it “ventured outside the limitations of 
its constrained inquiry and improperly considered and ruled upon the merits of the 
case.”24 Contrary to “black letter law” regarding separability, which reserves to 
courts the right to evaluate challenges to arbitration agreements and to arbitrators 
the right to evaluate the contract as a whole, Salamie believed that the trial court’s 
rulings as to Conrad’s “controlled person” status were permissible.25 Though the 
court explained that one of the only exceptions to the separability rule exists where 
the arbitration agreement was acquired by adhesion; a court may evaluate the 
merits of a claim asserting that a party was coerced via fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.26  
 Although Salamie was able to convince the trial court to rule on whether 
Conrad was a “controlled person,” “this foray into matters reserved for arbitral 
resolution was clearly improper.”27 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia concluded that where a court is asked to rule on a motion to compel 
arbitration pursuant to the FAA, the trial court may only decide the threshold issues 
of: 1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and 2) “whether the claims 
averred by the plaintiff fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration 
agreement.”28 The trial court here expressly exceeded its authority, and violated the 
doctrine of separability.29 
                                                 
23 Id. at 297 (citing United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)).  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 298.  
26 Ameritrade, 692 S.E.2d at 298 fn.9 (citing Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 
F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir 2002)).  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 298.  
29 Id.  
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IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
 
 In deciding that the arbitrator in Ameritrade exceeded his authority, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia aligned itself with other jurisdictions 
that have adhered to the doctrine of separability, which stipulates that courts are to 
decide only issues concerning the validity of an arbitration agreement, and the 
arbitrability of the claims between two parties. The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia has established not only its support for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration, but also the idea that arbitration is premised in contract. Parties in West 
Virginia now have the opportunity to contract for their desired arbitral 
proceedings, and courts likely will enforce these contractual arrangements. This 
indispensable decision will encourage the West Virginia court system to enforce 
arbitration agreements and awards, and ultimately indicates the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia’s movement towards the federal policy in favor of 
arbitration.   
 This decision also implicates the issue of excess judicial authority. By 
requiring the arbitrator to disregard the Circuit Court’s holding pertaining to 
Conrad’s “controlled person” status, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia established its deference to arbitrators and their authority to decide the 
substantive matters at issue. 
 
